AD 2005-06-05 Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model DC-8 Airplanes

Models named: DC-8. Read the applicability below — it usually turns on serial or part numbers too.

This AD applies to all McDonnell Douglas Model DC-8 airplanes, certificated in any category.

You are responsible for having the actions required by this AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the actions have already been done. Inspection of Pushrod Assemblies and Other Specified Actions (f) Within 24 months after the effective date of this AD: Do an inspection of the pushrod assemblies located in the left and right elevator control tabs to determine whether the assemblies are made of aluminum or steel. Replace any pushrod assembly made of aluminum with a new, improved pushrod assembly made of steel, or modify any existing steel pushrod assembly by replacing the aft end assembly with a new, improved aft end assembly, as applicable. Do the inspection, replacement or modification, and all other applicable specified actions by accomplishing all of the actions in the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin DC8-27A281, dated June 2, 2004. The replacement or modification and other applicable specified actions must be done before further flight. Inspection of Geared Tab Crank Assemblies and Other Specified Actions (g) Within 24 months after the effective date of this AD: Do an inspection of the inboard and outboard geared tab crank assemblies, located in the left and right elevators, to determine whether the assemblies are made of aluminum or steel. Replace any crank assembly made of aluminum with a new, improved crank assembly made of steel. Do the inspection, replacement, and other applicable specified actions by accomplishing all of the actions in the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin DC8-27A280, dated June 2, 2004. The replacement and other applicable specified actions must be done before further flight. Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs) (h) The Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested in accordance with the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Material Incorporated by Reference (i) You must use Boeing Alert Service Bulletin DC8-27A280, dated June 2, 2004; and Boeing Alert Service Bulletin DC8-27A281, dated June 2, 2004; as applicable; to perform the actions that are required by this AD; unless the AD specifies otherwise. The Director of the Federal Register approves the incorporation by reference of these documents in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. For copies of the service information, contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Long Beach Division, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Data and Service Management, Dept. C1-L5A (D800-0024). For information on the availability of this material at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), call (202) 741-6030, or go to http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ibr_locations.html . You may view the AD docket at the Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., room PL-401, Nassif Building, Washington, DC. Issued in Renton, Washington, on March 8, 2005. Ali Bahrami, Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. 05-5141 Filed 3-17-05; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

This AD was prompted by an accident involving a DC-8 airplane. The probable cause of the accident was a loss of pitch control resulting from the disconnection of the pushrod for the right elevator control tab. The pushrod dropped down and jammed in front of the control tab crank, causing a large deflection of the control tab. We are issuing this AD to minimize the possibility of a control tab offset. A control tab offset could cause elevator deflection, an elevator airplane-nose-up condition, and reduced controllability of the airplane. This AD was also prompted by a report that the elevator on a McDonnell Douglas Model DC-8 airplane did not respond to command inputs from the flightcrew. We are also issuing this AD to minimize the possibility of a crank assembly failure when the assembly is exposed to abnormal load conditions. Failure of a crank assembly could result in a jammed elevator and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane.