AD 2005-19-26 Airworthiness Directives; BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Model ATP Airplanes and Model HS 748 Airplanes

Models named: ATP, HS 748 series 2A, series 2B. Read the applicability below — it usually turns on serial or part numbers too.

This AD applies to all BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Model ATP airplanes and Model HS 748 series 2A and series 2B airplanes, certificated in any category.

You are responsible for having the actions required by this AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the actions have already been done. Detailed Inspections (f) Within 48 hours after the effective date of this AD, do the actions specified in paragraphs (f)(1), (f)(2), and (f)(3) of this AD, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Alert Service Bulletin ATP-A28-021, Revision 1, dated September 26, 2002 (for Model ATP airplanes); or BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Alert Service Bulletin HS748-A28-44, dated September 26, 2002 (for Model HS 748 airplanes); as applicable. (1) Do a detailed inspection of the cross feed drain pipe of the left and right wings between the fuel drain valve and the cross feed pipe for chafe damage. Before further flight, do any corrective action if applicable. (2) Do a detailed inspection of the electrical cable between the terminal block and fuel boost pump of the left and right wings for chafe damage. Before further flight, do any corrective action if applicable. (3) Do an inspection to determine the clearance between the cable loom and the cross feed drain pipe on the left and right wings. Before further flight, do any corrective action if applicable. No Reporting Requirement (g) Although the service bulletin referenced in this AD specifies to submit certain information to the manufacturer, this AD does not include that requirement. Special Flight Permit (h) Prohibited. Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs) (i)(1) The Manager, International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested in accordance with the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. (2) Before using any AMOC approved in accordance with 14 CFR 39.19 on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify the appropriate principal inspector in the FAA Flight Standards Certificate Holding District Office. Related Information (j) British airworthiness directives 001-09-2002 and 002-09-2002 also address the subject of this AD. Material Incorporated by Reference (k) You must use BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Alert Service Bulletin ATP-A28-021, Revision 1, dated September 26, 2002; or BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Alert Service Bulletin HS748-A28-44, dated September 26, 2002; as applicable, to perform the actions that are required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of these documents in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Contact British Aerospace Regional Aircraft American Support, 13850 Mclearen Road, Herndon, Virginia 20171, for a copy of this service information. You may review copies at the Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street SW., room PL-401, Nassif Building, Washington, DC; on the Internet at http://dms.dot.gov; or at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at the NARA, call (202) 741-6030, or go to http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ibr_locations.html. Issued in Renton, Washington, on September 15, 2005. Ali Bahrami, Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. 05-18909 Filed 9-26-05; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

This AD results from a fire in the dry area of the wing due to severe chafe damage between an electrical cable and the fuel cross feed drain pipe. We are issuing this AD to prevent chafe damage of the electrical cable and fuel cross feed drain pipe that could lead to fuel leakage from the drain pipe and an ignition source from the electrical cable, which could result in a fire in the dry area of the airplane wing.