AD 2007-23-01 Airworthiness Directives; Goodrich Evacuation Systems Approved Under Technical Standard Order (TSO) TSO-C69b and Installed on Airbus Model A330-200 and -300 Series Airplanes, Model A340-200 and -300 Series Airplanes, and Model A340-541 and -642 Airplanes

Models named: A330-201, -202, -203, -223, -243, -301, -321, -322, -323, -341. Read the applicability below — it usually turns on serial or part numbers too.

This AD applies to Goodrich evacuation systems approved under Technical Standard Order (TSO) TSO-C69b, as installed on Airbus Model A330-201, -202, -203, -223, -243, -301, -321, -322, -323, -341, -342, and -343 airplanes; Model A340-211, -212, -213, -311, -312, and -313 airplanes; and Model A340-541 and -642 airplanes; certificated in any category.

You are responsible for having the actions required by this AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the actions have already been done. Restatement of Requirements of AD 2006-12-08 Inspection for Certain Part Number (P/N) (f) For all airplanes: Within 36 months after July 17, 2006 (the effective date of AD 2006-12-08): Perform an inspection to determine the part number of the pressure relief valve on the Goodrich evacuation systems in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Goodrich Service Bulletin 25-355, dated July 25, 2005; or Goodrich Service Bulletin 25-355, Revision 1, dated July 24, 2006. After the effective date of this AD, only Goodrich Service Bulletin 25-355, Revision 1, dated July 24, 2006, may be used. (1) If any pressure relief valve having P/N 4A3791-3 is installed, before further flight, replace the valve with a new or serviceable valve having P/N 4A3641-1 and mark the girt adjacent to the placard, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of the service bulletin. (2) If any pressure release valve having P/N 4A3641-1 is installed, before further flight, mark the girt adjacent to the placard in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of the service bulletin. Part Installation for Airplanes Identified in Original Issue of the Service Bulletin (g) As of July 17, 2006, no person may install a pressure relief valve having P/N 4A3791-3, on any airplane equipped with Goodrich evacuation systems identified in Goodrich Service Bulletin 25-355, dated July 25, 2005. New Requirements of This AD Inspection for Certain Other P/N (h) For Model A340-541 airplanes: Within 36 months after the effective date of this AD, perform an inspection to determine the part number of the pressure relief valve on the Goodrich evacuation systems in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Goodrich Service Bulletin 25-355, Revision 1, dated July 24, 2006. (1) If any pressure relief valve having P/N 4A3791-6 is installed, before further flight, replace the valve with a new or serviceable valve having P/N 4A3641-26 and mark the girt adjacent to the placard, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of the service bulletin. (2) If any pressure release valve having P/N 4A3641-26 is installed, before further flight, mark the girt adjacent to the placard in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of the service bulletin. Parts Installation for All Airplanes (i) As of the effective date of this AD, no person may install a pressure relief valve having P/N 4A3791-3, on any airplane equipped with Goodrich evacuation systems identified in Goodrich Service Bulletin 25-355, Revision 1, dated July 24, 2006. (j) As of the effective date of this AD, no person may install a pressure relief valve having P/N 4A3791-6, on any airplane equipped with Goodrich evacuation systems identified in Goodrich Service Bulletin 25-355, Revision 1, dated July 24, 2006. Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs) (k)(1) The Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested in accordance with the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. (2) To request a different method of compliance or a different compliance time for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 39.19. Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify your appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local FSDO. (3) AMOCs approved previously in accordance with AD 2006-12-08 are approved as AMOCs for the corresponding provisions of this AD. Material Incorporated by Reference (l) You must use Goodrich Service Bulletin 25-355, dated July 25, 2005; or Goodrich Service Bulletin 25-355, Revision 1, dated July 24, 2006; as applicable, to perform the actions that are required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise. (1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of Goodrich Service Bulletin 25-355, Revision 1, dated July 24, 2006, in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. (2) On July 17, 2006 (71 FR 33606, June 12, 2006), the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of Goodrich Service Bulletin 25-355, dated July 25, 2005. (3) Contact Goodrich, Aircraft Interior Products, ATTN: Technical Publications, 3414 South Fifth Street, Phoenix, AZ 85040, for a copy of this service information. You may review copies at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to: http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html. Issued in Renton, Washington, on October 27, 2007. Stephen P. Boyd, Assistant Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. E7-21685 Filed 11-5-07; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

This AD results from a report indicating that, during maintenance testing, the pressure relief valves on the affected Goodrich evacuation systems did not seal when activated, which caused the pressure in the escape slide/raft to drop below the minimum allowable raft mode pressure. We are issuing this AD to prevent loss of pressure in the escape slides/rafts after an emergency evacuation, which could result in inadequate buoyancy to support the raft's passenger capacity during ditching, and increase the chance for injury to raft passengers.